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INTRODUCTION
The market capitalization of Enron Corporation declined by $63
billion in the one-year period between January 2001 and January
2002.1 In practical terms, this means that someone who invested in
Enron, Inc. for a comfortable retirement "nest egg" in 2001-say 3000
shares worth about $250,000-would barely have enough money to
buy a major home appliance a scant year later.2 Ironically, Enron's
shares were thought prior to January 2001 to experience relatively low
volatility.
The collapse of Enron dealt a stunning blow, not only to people's
wallets and a once-formidable U.S. corporation, but also to a number
of conventional theories and core beliefs within the legal academy.
The theories and beliefs challenged by the Enron debacle include the
f J. DuPratt White Professor of Law and Director, John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics, Cornell Law School. The author thanks Michael Heiss and the seminar partici-
pants in the Cornell Law School Faculty workshop series for helpful comments.
I See Gary Katz, Enron, CBC NEWS ONLINE, Feb. 2002, at http://www.cbc.ca/news/
features/enron.html.
2 See id.
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following: (1) the U.S. corporate governance system is the best in the
world; (2) the U.S. system of corporate disclosure is the best in the
world; and (3) the U.S. capital markets, particularly the markets for
large corporations such as those listed on the prestigious New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), are highly efficient.
Following a brief corporate history of Enron, Parts 1, 11, III, and
IV of this Article discuss, in turn, what remains of each of these con-
ventional academic theories in the wake of Enron's collapse. My prin-
cipal conclusions are as follows: Initially, with respect to U.S.
corporate governance, the collapse of Enron reveals the fundamental
tradeoff between objective and proximate monitoring by corporate
directors, auditors, rating agencies, analysts, and others.3 Second, the
collapse of Enron demonstrates that disaster ensues when supposedly
neutral and objective corporate monitors are "captured" by the firms
they are supposed to monitor. Third, the U.S. system of corporate
governance relies on these objective monitors more than other corpo-
rate governance systems, and is therefore more vulnerable when such
monitors fail, as was the case with Enron. The downfall of Enron also
illustrates both the importance of corporate governance to corporate
performance, and the inherent susceptibility to corruption present in
any system of corporate governance.
Further, from an international perspective, one is tempted to ask
whether the Enron debacle could happen in Europe or Japan or
whether it demonstrates a vulnerability unique to the U.S. system of
corporate governance. I have three observations to make on this is-
sue. First and foremost, the Enron fiasco demonstrates the acute pres-
sure felt by U.S. corporate management to produce superior
performance results. As discussed later in this Article, Enron's finan-
cial maneuvering, which led to the company's massive 2001 restate-
ment of earnings, was prompted only in 1997 when Enron came
under significant pressure from investors. Essentially, Enron's corpo-
rate performance was consistent for a considerable period of time
prior to 1997. 4 However, between 1996 and 1997, the firm's profits
and return on equity each declined by ninety percent.5 The sudden
deterioration in performance pressured management to engage in
transactions that increased revenue and moved debt off of the firm's
3 This monitoring tradeoff is developed in more detail in my Article coauthored with
Arnoud Boot, also presented in this Symposium. See Arnoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R.
Macey, Monitoring Corporate Performance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in
Corporate Governance, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 356, 357-60 (2004).
4 SeeAnthony H. Catanach, Jr. & Shelley Rhoades-Catanach, Enron: A Financial Report-
ing Failure, 48 VILL. L. Rrv. 1057, 1058-60, tbls. 2, 3 (2003).
5 Id. at tbl. 3 (showing decline in profit margin ratio from 4.27% in 1996 to 0.43% in
1997 and in return on equity from 15.26% in 1996 to 1.57% in 1997).
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balance sheet.6 This intense pressure on corporate management is
unique to the U.S. system of corporate governance.
Second, outhide the United States, management's incentives to
succumb to the creative accounting gimmicks that Enron employed
are significantly weaker. From an international perspective, Enron's
collapse demonstrates the strength of the U.S. system of corporate gov-
ernance, namely the intensely competitive environment in which U.S.
management teams operate. In the vast majority of cases, this envi-
ronment causes management to work extremely hard, producing su-
perior results in response to increased pressure.
However, in rare cases like Enron, the "pressure-cooker" environ-
ment leads managers of U.S. corporations and their advisors to take
shortcuts and mislead investors about corporate performance. Inde-
pendent monitors are supposed to deal with these "rare cases" by
identifying cheaters and publicly announcing their wrongdoings.
One of the principal lessons to be gleaned from Enron's collapse is
that the U.S. system for monitoring corporate management has itself
become corrupt.
Third, the Enron catastrophe puts considerable pressure on the
traditional law and economics model of corporate disclosure. Accord-
ing to this model, firms have strong incentives to disclose information
in order to distinguish themselves from poorly performing rivals.7
Fear of negative sanctions prevents firms from misrepresenting their
corporate performance.8 Part III of this Article considers these issues.
It appears that, at least in some cases, the traditional law and econom-
ics model of corporate disclosure should be replaced by a prisoners'
dilemma model, in which all firms have incentives to engage in minor
cheating, in the hope that excessive cheating-which would cause in-
vestors to distrust the system-will not be the end result.
In Part IV of this Article, I consider Enron's implications for the
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH). The ECMH posits that
share prices of publicly traded companies change quickly to reflect
new information, such as changes in the financial condition of the
company.9 In particular, the "semistrong" form of the ECMH posits
that share prices react quickly to reflect publicly available informa-
6 Such financial alchemy began in 1997 with the establishment of special purpose
entities. See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVES-
TIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 36-40 , at http://
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport02OlO2.pdf (Feb. 1, 2002)
[hereinafter POWERS REPORT].
7 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 674 (1984).
8 See id. at 677.
9 See Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95, 96-97
(1978) [hereinafter Anomalous Evidence].
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tion.10 The collapse of Enron dealt a blow to the ECMH. Because
Enron had massive amounts of debt loosely hidden under a compli-
cated matrix of thousands of special purpose entities structured as
partnerships and usually organized offshore, the market was unable to
penetrate the "cloud cover" of these accounting gimmicks to uncover
Enron's true economic conditions.
Enron's board of directors apparently knew of these entities for
at least four years prior to the company's collapse and, further, that
the "aggressive" accounting techniques employed by Enron's account-
ing firm helped bury these facts. 1' The semistrong form of the ECMH
remains intact after Enron's collapse only because public disclosures
by Enron showed that the company was very strong. The special pur-
pose entities hid Enron's true financial condition so that the com-
pany's books indicated that Enron was in far better shape than it truly
was, and one would "have had to do an almost impossible inspection
to know" the true financial condition of the company.12
Unfortunately, while the ECMH remains more or less intact after
Enron as a theoretical academic construct, it is not obvious what rele-
vance, if any, the theory still holds. Part IV of this Article details the
exceedingly poor performance in the Enron case of the institutions
and infrastructures that drive markets to function efficiently. Thus,
another key lesson from the collapse of Enron is that improving tradi-
tional mechanisms of market efficiency provides a very effective way of
reducing the probability that such debacles will occur in the future.
In particular, improving market participants' ability to short stock and
to buy and sell single stock index futures will provide effective "early
warning systems" to alert the public and regulators of companies rid-
dled with financial fraud.
I
A BRIEF HISTORY OF ENRON CORPORATION
Enron Corporation was formed in 1985 as an interstate pipeline
company when two utility companies, Houston Natural Gas and
Omaha, Nebraska-based InterNorth merged, creating the first nation-
wide natural gas pipeline system in the United States. 13 Kenneth Lay,
former CEO of Houston Natural Gas, was named chairman and CEO
of Enron.14 By 1989, Enron was the largest natural gas provider in the
10 See id. at 97.
11 See Katz, supra note 1.
12 Id.
13 See Enron Milestones, July 1985, at http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroonVmilestones
/frameset.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Milestones].
14 Enron Timeline, Hous. CHRON. ONLINE Uan. 17, 2002), available at http://www.
chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/special/enron/ 1127125.
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United States and the United Kingdom 15 By 1990, the corporation
had expanded, trading natural gas, electricity, and other energy-re-
lated commodities and ranking as the seventh largest U.S. company in
terms of revenue. 16 Its employees overwhelmingly chose to invest
their 401 (k) retirement funds primarily in Enron's own stock, despite
the fact that they had nineteen other investment options.17
Over the years, Enron opened several international offices and
acquired several companies that further expanded its international
presence.18 In 1993, Enron entered into an investment partnership
with the California Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) named
JEDI I, in which each entity invested $250 million. 19 In January 1997,
Enron revealed its new logo and first global advertising campaign.20
Later that year, after announcing a quarterly loss, Enron established
so-called "Special Purpose Entities" (SPEs) for "hedging" purposes.2 1
Enron created Chewco, an SPE composed of Enron executives and
undisclosed outsiders to buy out CalPERS' share of JEDI I. After sell-
ing its shares of JEDI I, CalPERS agreed to invest in another partner-
ship with Enron, JEDI II, in which each invested $500 million. 22
Enron ultimately included these off-balance sheet entities on its bal-
ance sheet, resulting in huge writeoffs for the company.
Enron's expansion and acquisitions continued over the next sev-
eral years. In June 1999, Andrew Fastow, former CFO of Enron, pro-
posed the creation of two partnerships, LJM1 in June 1999 and LJM2
in October 1999.23 As time went on, the number of unconsolidated
partnerships increased.
In January 2000, Fortune Magazine named Enron "The Most In-
novative Company in America" for the fifth consecutive year and
ranked Enron 24th in a survey listing the 100 best companies to work
15 See Milestones, supra note 13.
16 Douglas M. Branson, Enron-When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap to
Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 989, 997-98 (describing Enron's corporate
history).
17 See Katz, supra note 1 ("[Enron's] 401(k) fund .. .held great chunks of Enron
shares, in fact over 60 per cent of the fund was made up of them. Though employees had
20 investment options to choose from for the fund, their own company, so obviously flour-
ishing, was a clear favourite.").
18 Enron Timeline, supra note 14.
19 See Kathleen Pender, CaIPERS Had Enron Because Many Did, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 9,
2001, at Cl, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=chronicle/archive/
2001/12/09/BU208202.DTL.
20 See id. (explaining the basic financial details of CalPERS' investments in the two
JEDI partnerships).
21 See PowERs REPORT, supra note 6, at 13-17.
22 See Pender, supra note 19.
23 See PowERs REPoRT, supra note 6, at 68-76. Fastow was to serve as both a general
and limited partner for LJM1 and LJM2. See id. at 70-71, 74.
[Vol. 89:394
EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS
for in America.24 By March, Enron was the sixth largest energy com-
pany in the world based on market capitalization according to the En-
ergy Financial Group. 25 In February 2001, Jeffrey Skilling succeeded
Lay as Enron's next CEO. 26
Although several news articles questioned the profitability of En-
ron as well as other energy companies over the next year, Enron was
again named "The Most Innovative Company in America" in 2001 by
Fortune Magazine for a sixth consecutive year.27 Skilling resigned as
CEO in August 2001, less than seven months after he began.28 Wall
Street increased its requests for a detailed report of Enron's financial
performance, and the Wall Street Journal published a three-day series of
articles on Enron's partnerships. 29
In October 2001, Enron reported its first quarterly loss since
1997, $618 million, and a reduction in shareholder equity of over $1
billion.3 0 In November 2001, Enron announced that it had overstated
its earnings back to 1997 by about $600 million3' and, as a result, En-
ron share prices plunged to approximately four dollars from a high of
more than ninety.32 By the end of November, Enron bonds were offi-
cially classifiable as junk bonds, and on December 2, Enron filed for
protection from its creditors under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code. 33
II
ENRON AND U.S. CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE
Monitoring is the central, defining feature of any system of corpo-
rate governance. Corporate monitors come in a variety of forms, in-
cluding directors, auditors, credit rating agencies, stock market
analysts, takeover firms, arbitrageurs, large shareholders, and outside
24 See Milestones, supra note 13.
25 See id.
26 Bethany McLean, Why Enron Went Bust, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 58, 61.
27 See id. (noting that Enron was "voted Most Innovative among FORTUNE's Most
Admired Companies" and that by 2000 it was "the seventh-largest company on the FOR-
TUNE 500").
28 See id. at 66.
29 See, e.g., John Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, EnronJolt: Investments, Assets Generate Big
Loss, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2001, at Cl; Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Enron CFO's
Partnership Had Millions in Profit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2001, at Cl; Rebecca Smith &John R.
Emshwiller, Partnership Spurs Enron Equity Cut, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2001, at Cl.
30 SeeJathon Sapsford & Suzanne McGee, Enron's Financial Troubles Reverberate to Bonds
with Poor Liquidity and Credit-Rating Concerns, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2001, at C14.
31 See McLean, supra note 26, at 68.
32 See Rebecca Smith & Robin Sidel, Enron and Dynegy May Cut Price of Deal by 40%,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2001, at A3; Time Line: Enron (Feb. 4, 2002), at http://www.guard-
ian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4342321-110384,00.html.
33 See McLean, supra note 26, at 68.
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lenders. 34 One may even view customers and suppliers as monitors
because of their ability to observe management quality and send effec-
tive signals to the market regarding management's performance.
Arnoud Boot and I have identified in a different article what we
regard as a fundamental tradeoff encountered when evaluating the
ability of a monitor to improve a corporate governance system: the
tradeoff between objectivity and proximity.35 We posit a model of corpo-
rate governance that captures this tradeoff, such that those designing
corporate governance systems must choose a system that features one of
these characteristics or the other, but not both. 36
Alternatively, we argue that certain corporate governance sys-
tems, such as the one in place in Italy, feature neither attribute, but
have proven to be successful nonetheless. 37 Without either proximity
or objectivity to guarantee the effective monitoring and discipline of
management, investors will be reluctant to invest, and firms will be
required to turn to internal sources of finance. Despite its obvious
costs, such a system has hidden virtues. In particular, it provides
strong incentives for managers to make the firm-specific human capi-
tal investments necessary to develop specialized skills.38
A. Proximity
In systems of corporate governance similar to those that exist in
Germany and the Netherlands, one often finds intimate, sustained,
intensive, and finely textured monitoring of management, either by
significant shareholders or by largely autonomous, entrenched boards
of directors-supervisory boards-who enjoy close proximity to the
firms they monitor.39 Through their participation in decisionmaking
and real-time supervision of management activity, these significant
shareholders and supervisory boards inevitably become insiders and
are frequently captured by the firms they are monitoring. Participa-
tion in the decisionmaking process not only requires readier access to
information than that needed by outside monitors, such as takeover
artists, arbitrageurs, credit rating agencies, and analysts, but also estab-
lishes the conditions by which incumbent management will likely cap-
ture the monitors. Capture occurs when the ostensible monitor loses
its independence and adopts the perspective of the management team
being supervised. The gradual resulting loss of the ability to evaluate
34 See Boot & Macey, supra note 3, at 357.
35 See id. at 357-60.
36 Id. at 357.
37 See id. at 385-88; Jonathan R. Macey, Italian Corporate Governance: One American's
Perspective, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 121, 140.
38 See Macey, supra note 37, at 142-43.
39 See Edward S. Adams, Corporate Governance After Enron and Global Crossing: Compara-
tive Lessons for Cross-National Improvement, 78 IND. L.J. 723, 762-63 (2003).
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the firms' performance in an objective manner mitigates the informa-
tional advantage that these insiders enjoy. 40
B. Objectivity
By contrast, far less monitoring comes from directors, large share-
holders, or others in close proximity to the firm's managers in the
United States' system of corporate governance. Rather, a variety of
outside forces and institutions, including credit rating agencies, in-
vestment banking analysts, and especially those in the market for cor-
porate control, substitute for direct shareholder involvement. In such
a system, considerable distance exists between monitors (investors)
and management. Without the kind of "proximity" described above,
investors may be unable to obtain timely, reliable information about
management. 4 1
In theory, this shortage of information could negatively impact
the effectiveness of corporate governance systems in regimes in which
monitors lack close proximity to management. This is especially true
in the United States, as monitoring is generally ex post and evaluative
rather than ex ante and proactive. 42 However, the U.S. system also
benefits from this lack of proximity, because the distance between
U.S. investors and firms in which they invest brings with it a high de-
gree of objectivity not present in corporate governance systems in
which the proximity of monitoring subjects them to the risk of cap-
ture.43  This objectivity increases the probability that the outside
monitors will sanction corrupt or underperforming managers.
C. Adaptability
Our discussion of proximity and objectivity makes two points.
First, effective monitoring of corporate management cannot exist un-
less the monitors possess the characteristics of either proximity or ob-
jectivity. Second, there is a tradeoff between proximity and objectivity
that prevents a corporate governance system from providing monitor-
ing that is both proximate and objective.
40 See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and
the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213,
232 (1999).
41 See id. at 223 (reasoning that, in a market system like the United States',
"[m]anagement has superior information respecting investment policy and the firm's pros-
pects, but this information tends to be either soft or proprietary and therefore cannot
credibly be communicated to actors in trading markets").
42 See Boot & Macey, supra note 3, at 359.
43 See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 40, at 224 ("[A]Ithough market system share-
holders and their outside-director agents cannot access full information about firm opera-
tions, their very distance from operations .... makes them relatively immune to capture by
the management interest and assures objective evaluation of the information they do
receive.").
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Investors shy away from investing in systems in which monitors
are neither proximate nor objective because they know they will be
unable to protect themselves from opportunistic management behav-
ior. Such pathological corporate governance systems, which are eco-
nomic hallmarks of developing countries, must adapt to survive.
These adaptations, which generally involve internal sources of fi-
nance, have benefits that are not obvious at first glance, such as en-
couraging firm and asset-specific capital investments. 44
D. The Role of Shareholders
Direct shareholder involvement might solve the problem of cor-
porate governance. In the United States, however, direct shareholder
involvement is mitigated by the fact that share ownership is relatively
diverse, which limits shareholders' involvement to periodic interfer-
ence through proxy fights, hostile takeovers, or other mechanisms de-
signed to mobilize shareholders. 45 Thus, involvement by small-stakes
shareholders exists more in theory than in practice. 46
In Continental Europe, concentrated ownership is more preva-
lent,47 but this does not readily translate into more shareholder con-
trol. In some Western and Southern European countries, such as
Germany, cross holdings and pyramid structures shield firms from
shareholders. 48 Also, nonexecutive directors, or supervisory boards in
a two-tier system, protect management from direct shareholder in-
44 See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54J. FiN. 471
(1999) (demonstrating that diverse ownership through shareholding has been limited in
developing economies); Erik Bergl6f & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Changing Corporate
Governance Paradigm: Implications for Transition and Developing Countries, available at http://
www.worldbank.org/research/abcde/washington_l 1/pdfs/berglof.pdf (preliminary draft)
(noting the closely held nature of firms in developing countries and some benefits of such
concentrated ownership).
45 Shareholder control generally becomes more powerful when financial difficulties
and managerial control problems emerge. In those circumstances, we often observe a con-
centration of shareholdings. See generally Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Share-
holders and Corporate Control, 94J. POL. ECON. 461 (1986) (demonstrating that when larger
shareholders believe that incumbent management is performing poorly and the firm could
be run better by new managers, the large shareholders have greater incentive to either
acquire more shares or to monitor and negotiate with current management to increase
performance).
46 SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15
CARDOzo L. REV. 837, 848, 906-07 (1994) (stating that, as of 1991, over 50% of outstand-
ing stock in U.S. companies was held by institutional investors, who did not regularly exert
influence over management decisions because such investors are "inclined to rely more on
exit than voice" to protect their investment).
47 See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 40, at 218 n.8 (comparing the share dispersion
in the U.S. with several foreign countries).
48 SeeJanis Sarra, Corporate Governance in Global Capital Markets, Canadian and Interna-
tional Developments, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1691, 1722 (2002).
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volvement. 49 This is particularly true in certain Continental European
countries, like the Netherlands and-to a lesser extent-Germany,
where relatively autonomous supervisory boards operate semi-inde-
pendently of shareholders and effectively shield management from di-
rect shareholder involvement. 50 Thus, direct shareholder control
over management is actually quite limited in many European coun-
tries, just as it is in the United States. 5'
The Enron collapse illustrates the basic tradeoff at the core of the
Boot-Macey theory of corporate governance. 52 In theory, Enron had
both proximate monitors-its directors-as well as numerous objec-
tive monitors: outside auditors, bankers, credit rating agencies, and,
of course, the cadre of stock market analysts who followed Enron.
None of these monitors did their jobs effectively because the corpora-
tion captured both the proximate and the objective monitors.
Enron's Board clearly trusted management too much and did not
adequately understand or question the self-dealing transactions be-
tween top managers and the corporation. However, such faith on the
part of proximate managers is unsurprising. The more troubling
question is why Enron's ostensibly objective monitors did such a poor
job.
E. Analysts
Incredibly, in October 2001, despite the stock price having fallen
by fifty percent in the previous six months and articles in the financial
49 Deeply entrenched in U.S. law is an emphasis on the duties that directors and
officers owe to shareholders. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.
506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (finding that "[a] board may have regard for various constit-
uencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits
accruing to the stockholders"); L.A. Hamermesh, The Shareholder Rights By-Law: Doubts from
Delaware, 5 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 9 (1997) ("Delaware fully supports the proposition,
dismissed in some quarters as myopic, that the business and affairs of a Delaware for profit
stock corporation are to be managed so as to maximize the value of the investment of one
group and one group only, its stockholders."); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247 (1999) (arguing the controver-
sial point of view that American corporate law should require directors to act in the inter-
est of the firm, and not solely in the interest of shareholders). This focus mimics
Continental European corporate governance arrangement. For example, Dutch corporate
law explicitly states that directors should serve the interests of the firm as an entity. See
Winfried van den Muijsenbergh, Corporate Governance: The Dutch Experience, 16 TRANSNAT'L
LAw. 63, 65 (2002).
50 See ThomasJ. Andr6, Jr., Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance: A Glimpse at
German Supervisory Boards, 70 TUL. L. REv. 1819 (1996); Muijsenbergh, supra note 49, at 65.
51 Shareholder control is very real in cases where no separation exists between owner-
ship and control, as one would expect in the case of family businesses. See Shleifer &
Vishny, supra note 45, at 462. Nevertheless, the corporate governance debate focuses not
on these businesses but rather on large public firms characterized by a separation of own-
ership and control.
52 See discussion supra Part II.A, B.
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press calling Enron's financial statements "impenetrable,"53 all sixteen
analysts tracked by Thomson Financial/First Call rated Enron a "buy,"
and thirteen called it a "strong buy."'54 Worse, in November 2001-
less than a month prior to Enron's bankruptcy filing, and after it had
been disclosed that the SEC was investigating Enron's accounting
practices-eleven of the thirteen analysts following Enron still recom-
mended that the public purchase the stock, and only one recom-
mended selling it.55 Clearly, the analyst community was worthless to
Enron investors.
The problem with the analysts' recommendations is not difficult
to grasp. Investment banks pressure the analysts they employ to give
positive ratings to companies tracked by issuers because positive rat-
ings boost stock prices and generate capital for their investment bank-
ing clients. The case of investment banking analyst Chung Wu
perhaps best illustrates this problem. UBS Paine Webber, Wu's em-
ployer, fired him on the same day that he recommended some of his
clients sell Enron stock.56 UBS Paine Webber administered the Enron
employee stock option plan and had a "strong buy" position on Enron
three days before the firing and re-affirmed the "strong buy" rating
immediately after firing Wu. Shares of Enron stock were trading for
$36 per share on the day Wu was fired. 57 Three months later, Enron
had collapsed.
The Wu anecdote demonstrates that analysts cannot effectively
serve as corporate monitors. Analysts cannot act objectively when the
very companies they are supposed to monitor capture their employ-
ers. A recent study by Roni Michaely and Kent Womack, comparing
analysts' recommendations of companies taken public by the broker-
dealer firms that employed the analysts with recommendations by ana-
53 See Bethany McLean, Is Enron Overpriced?, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001, at 122, 123.
54 See The Watchdogs Didn't Bark: Enron and the Wall Street Analysts: Hearing Before the Sen.
Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Charles L. Hill, Director of Re-
search, Thomson Financial/First Call) ("[O]n the eve of Enron's third quarter 2001 earn-
ings report, [thirteen] broker analysts had a strong buy[,] ... three had a buy, and none
had a hold, sell, or strong sell.").
55 Id. at 55. According to Mr. Hill,
[b]y November 12, almost a month after Enron had announced a $1.2 bil-
lion write-off that Ken Lay could not explain on a conference call, almost a
month after the Wall Street Journal reported Enron executives stood to make
millions from Enron partnerships, [three] weeks after the CFO was fired,
[two] weeks after Enron announced it was being investigated by the SEC,
and [four] days after Enron announced that it had overstated [four] years
of earnings by $600 million ... there were still eight analysts with a strong
buy, three with a buy, one with a hold, and one with a strong sell.
Id.
56 See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., The Man Who Paid the Price for Sizing Up Enron, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2002, at C1.
57 See id.
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lysts at disinterested broker-dealers, produced similar conclusions. 58
Specifically, the study demonstrated that stocks recommended by un-
derwriter-affiliated analysts performed significantly worse than stocks
recommended by independent analysts. 59
Not surprisingly, buy recommendations have been the norm on
Wall Street for some time. While two-thirds of all analysts' recommen-
dations are either "buy" or "strong buy," less than two percent of such
recommendations are either "sell" or "strong sell." 60
The rules regulating analysts must be reformed in order to regain
investors' trust in the U.S. corporate governance system. Recently, the
SEC approved changes in the rules concerning management and dis-
closure of conflicts of interest between research and invest-banking
activities. 61 These new rules limit the amount of compensation ana-
lysts can receive and restrict their ability to trade the securities they
analyze. 62  Furthermore, the SEC's new rules prohibit offering
favorable research to attract business, and they require disclosure of
analysts' ownership or interests in a client company.63
F. Credit Rating Agencies
If anything, the major credit rating agencies-Standard & Poor's
and Moody's-performed even worse than financial analysts during
the Enron debacle. Neither Standard & Poor's nor Moody's down-
graded Enron's debt below investment grade status until November
28, 2001, four days before the firm's bankruptcy, when the company's
share price had plunged to a paltry sixty-one cents. 64 Although credit
rating agencies' loss of independence and analysts' conflicts of inter-
est stem from two different sources, the result is the same: these sup-
58 See Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Under-
writer Analyst Recommendations, 12 REv. FIN. STun. 653-57 (1999).
59 See id.
60 See Lewis Braham, Stock Ratings That Won't Give You the Runaround, Bus. WK., Sept.
17, 2001, at 110.
61 See Press Release, New York Stock Exchange, SEC Approves Sweeping Changes in
Rules Regarding Research Analysts, (May 8, 2002), at http://www.nyse.com/press/
1043881801503.html; Self Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule
Changes by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amend-
ment No. 2 to the Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. and Amendment No. I to the Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Ex-
change, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act Release No.
34-45908, 67 Fed. Reg. 34968-01 (May 10, 2002).
62 Id. at 34970.
63 Id. at 34969.
64 Thomas S. Mulligan & Nancy Vogel, Collapse of Merger Pushes Enron to Brink of Ruin:
Bankruptcy Filing Is Likely as Stock Value Withers and Bonds Fall to "Junk" Status, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2001, at Al.
2004] 405
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
posedly outside monitors do not perform the corporate governance
role on which investors rely.
Downgrades to below investment grade ratings are problematic
because they become self-fulfilling prophecies. 65 For most publicly
traded companies, such downgrades make bankruptcy a foregone
conclusion because they signal that the company can no longer raise
the debt necessary to support its operations. Thus, when such a com-
pany receives a downgrade from a credit rating agency, it will be una-
ble to attract the credit needed to finance its operations: suppliers and
trading counter-parties demand payment in advance, and the firm col-
lapses because its creditors cut off liquidity. Many other companies'
public debt goes into technical default upon a downgrade below a
certain rating level, usually investment grade. A downgrade directly
prompts bankruptcy for such a company because defaulting on its
debt obligations triggers the company's obligation to repay hundreds
of millions of dollars of debt.66
Because a rating downgrade effectively functions like a corporate
nuclear bomb, credit rating agencies are extremely reluctant to use
their power to downgrade a company's debt. This, in turn, under-
mines the efficacy of credit ratings as a corporate governance device.
For Enron, the corporation's $250 million in rated senior unsecured
debt had declined in value from ninety cents to thirty-five cents on the
dollar in the month preceding its downgrade. In other words, the
market rejected the investment grade rating on Enron's debt before
the credit rating agencies exercised their power to downgrade it.
G. The Market for Corporate Control
Some Chicago School economists have argued that market forces
alone, particularly the market for corporate control, can resolve the
problem of corporate accountability. Henry Manne, for example, has
asserted that "Enron is a predictable consequence of rules that inhibit
the efficient functioning of the market for corporate control. '67 He
suggests that the takeover market is the most efficient mechanism not
only for disciplining inefficient management, but also for reducing
the incidence of corporate scandals caused by managers with low
morals. The market for corporate control is an extremely powerful
65 See id. (noting that Moody's and Standard & Poor's cut Enron's ratings "knowing
that they probably were pronouncing a death sentence").
66 This was in fact the case with regard to some Enron credit agreements. See SeanJ.
Griffith, Afterward and Comment: Towards an Ethical Duty to Market Investors, 35 CONN. L. REv.
1223, 1238 (2003).
67 Henry G. Manne, Bring Back the Hostile Takeover, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2003, at A16;
see also Paolo Mastrolilli, Interview with Milton Friedman, LA STAMPA, June 25, 2002 (Del 10/
7/2002 Sezione: Economia Pag. 3) (on file with author) (proposing that solution "for cor-
rupt or incompetent managers comes from competition for control of the company").
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corporate governance device, and, in my view, the cornerstone of U.S.
corporate governance. However, the market for corporate control is
not capable of dealing with recent corporate governance problems
involving artificially inflated earnings, profits, and other measures of
corporate performance. 68
The market for corporate control exerts powerful disciplinary
pressure on underperforming management in that share prices will
lag in companies with slothful or corrupt management. These de-
pressed share prices present attractive investment opportunities for
entrepreneurial corporate raiders, who profit by purchasing a control-
ling interest in underperforming companies and installing more com-
petent and motivated management. 69
However, the market for corporate control only disciplines bad
management when the target firm's share prices are underperforming
relative to their potential. Accounting fraud, however, causes share
prices to be artificially inflated, rather than depressed. Consequently,
the takeover entrepreneurs who drive the market for corporate con-
trol have no incentive to utilize the takeover market to monitor and
discipline managers who successfully employ questionable accounting
practices to overinflate their companies' share prices.70 In fact, the
prospect of accounting fraud impedes the market for corporate con-
trol because the danger that such fraud exists deprives potential
outside bidders of the ability to know with certainty the value of the
assets they might be acquiring. More fundamentally, the market for
corporate control depends on efficiency in the capital markets, but if
share prices do not reflect managers' actual performance, the market
for corporate control cannot effectively discipline corporate
management.
H. Accounting Firms
Accounting firms, like stock analysts and credit rating agencies,
have proven to be rather ineffective objective monitors of corporate
governance due to capture problems not unlike those that plague
analysts.
Accounting firms would appear to be ideal objective monitors
from an outsider's perspective. A significant client like Enron repre-
sents only a tiny fraction of global revenues for even the largest ac-
68 See E.S. Browning, Investor Confidence Remains Fickle, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2002, at C1
("Scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Tyco International, Adelphia Communi-
cations, ImClone Systems and a host of other companies have raised questions about
whether corporate earnings reports and corporate executives can be trusted.").
69 See Schleifer & Vishny, supra note 45, at 462 (noting that the raider benefits when
the share prices of the target firm rise to reflect the improved earnings generated by the
new management team).
70 See id.
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counting firms. Consequently, it seems illogical for a massive
accounting firm like Arthur Andersen to risk its reputation by sacrific-
ing its independent judgment in order to please a single miscreant
client like Enron.71
However irrational it was for Arthur Andersen to become cap-
tured by Enron, capture may not have seemed irrational to the indi-
vidual Arthur Andersen partners auditing Enron. Because partners in
big accounting firms have only one client, their professional success
depends upon the quality of the relationships they form with their
clients' top managers. Accounting debacles like Enron's were inevita-
ble in an environment that rewards audit partners who are captured
by their client and punishes those who report negative information
about their clients through the proper corporate channels.
Arthur Andersen partners assigned to the Enron account ignored
their own specialists' advice, which would have stopped Enron from
falsifying its financial records.72 Furthermore, when Andersen ac-
counting specialists concluded that some of Enron's practices were
improper, they were overridden by the Houston office and, in some
instances, were taken off the Enron account altogether if the firm dis-
agreed with their decisions or their portrayal of Enron in a less-than-
positive light.73
Thus, Arthur Andersen demonstrated that audit teams assigned
to large accounts may be willing to risk their firms' reputations be-
cause doing so is extremely profitable for the individual partners.
Moreover, Arthur Andersen's frightening acquiescence to Enron's ag-
gressive accounting practices, its failure to warn the market about En-
ron's precarious financil situation, and its inability to adequately
explain what went wrong in its handling of the Enron account are
symptoms of a problem afflicting the entire accounting profession.
For decades, the accounting profession flourished because inves-
tors demanded honest, independent scrutiny of companies' financial
records. Companies subjected themselves to this scrutiny because it
was necessary to attract outside capital.74 Because internal accounting
services would cost only a fraction of the price of an outside auditor,
the strong market demand for outside audito,-s is best explained by
outside investors' willingness to pay more for securities issued by com-
71 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 675.
72 Kurt Eichenwald with Floyd Norris, Early Verdict on Audit: Procedures Ignored, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 2002, at C6 (noting that "Anderson's top accounting specialists had con-
cluded that some of Enron's most questionable accounting practices were improper, only
to have their conclusions overridden by Anderson's Houston office").
73 See id. (providing anecdotal evidence, not unlike the Chung Wu story described
above in Part ILE, about the silencing of lower-level Anderson auditors who refused to sign
off on certain dubious Enron transactions).
74 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 675.
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panies whose books have been independently audited. In other
words, the economic justification for the accounting profession is that
reputational capital-auditors' reputations for honesty and integ-
rity-makes companies' securities more valuable. 75
In the past, accounting firms would approve companies' financial
records only if they conformed to the high standards imposed by the
accounting profession. Investors trusted accountants because they
knew that sloppy or corrupt accounting firms would not stay in busi-
ness for long. Accounting firms believed that the long-term deteriora-
tion of their reputation from doing slipshod or fraudulent work
significantly outweighed any possible short-term gains obtained by cut-
ting corners.76 For this reason, companies subjected themselves to
public audits, thereby sending a strong signal to investors that their
financial house was in order. More importantly, auditors would dis-
miss companies that refused to comply with the their demands for
reporting transparently and simply. As I have noted elsewhere, being
fired by an accounting firm sent a strong negative signal to investors
that often devastated the company and led to the dismissal of top
management.77
Unfortunately, in recent years, the balance of power between ac-
counting firms and their clients has shifted dramatically, reducing the
clout of accounting firms and empowering their client companies in-
stead. This change threatens to undermine the investing public's
faith in the quality of financial reporting. Further, if left unchecked,
this shift in power will undermine the integrity of the financial mar-
kets because perceived inaccuracies in a company's financial records
will prompt investors to either charge prohibitive rates to compensate
for the uncertain risk of investment, or else cease investing altogether.
Moreover, the exclusive relationship between audit partner and
client, upon which the partner's career largely depends, makes the
partner particularly susceptible to client capture. 78 Thus, even
though Arthur Andersen was deemed "independent" because Enron
accounted for less than one percent of Andersen's total billings, En-
ron accounted for all of the billings of the lead partner assigned to
Enron and for several members of his audit team.79 Further, Arthur
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, "57 Bus.
LAw. 1403, 1411 (2002) (noting that such firing causes "embarrassment" to the company);
Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence
and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1167, 1169 (2003) (being fired by
an accounting firm "often would both devastate a company and lead to the dismissal of top
management").
78 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
79 See Ken Brown & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Sad Account: Andersen's Fall From Grace Is a
Tale of Greed and Miscues, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2002, at Al.
2004]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Andersen's management in Chicago apparently relied solely on the
captured audit team for information about the client.80 Though not
an uncommon practice among accounting firms, this disproportion-
ate reliance on the particular audit team assigned to a client gives
investors ample reason to worry about the quality and uniformity of
these firms' financial reporting practices. 81 Arthur Andersen's top
management fired David Duncan, the lead Enron audit partner, and
placed three other partners also involved with Enron on administra-
tive leave for violating the firm's "reasonable good judgment" policy.82
This disciplinary action may not have been necessary, however, if An-
dersen's top management had itself exercised "reasonable good judg-
ment" in its supervision of the Enron audit team. Preventing the
recurrence of Enron-like financial disasters requires improved inter-
nal monitoring and control in accounting firms.
Enron damaged investors' faith in the integrity of financial mar-
kets, and particularly in the U.S. system of corporate disclosure. That
system will not function properly until a lead audit partner can confi-
dently fire a dishonest client without jeopardizing his career.
To fix the system, reform is needed. The state pension funds in
New York and North Carolina have proposed a scheme which would
award their brokerage business only to firms that make structural
changes to reduce conflicts of interest.83 Other institutional investors
should likewise pressure intermediaries to reform.8 4 The elimination
of ties between analysts' compensation and the ratings they issue or
the business they attract is one important and viable change. Analysts'
compensation could instead be based on the quality and accuracy of
the analysts' forecasts as compared to their competitors. Such a com-
pensation scheme would reduce the proclivity toward the current
"herd" behavior in analysts' recommendations.8 5 Regulation is un-
likely to be effective in this context, and so investment banks and
other "sell side" financial intermediaries must adapt their services to a
changing market environment. If firms do not change, the demand
for their analysts' services probably will erode demonstrably.
80 See In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative and ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 679
(S.D. Tex. 2002); Macey & Sale, supra note 77, at 1179-82.
81 See Macey & Sale, supra note 77, at 1181-82.
82 See Ken Brown et al., Paper Trail: Andersen Fires Partner It Says Led Shredding of Enron
Documents, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2002, at Al.
83 Charles Gasparino, Two Big States Tell Wall Street: Reform, or Else!, WALL ST. J., June 7
2002, at Cl.
84 Because of their significant economic clout, institutional investors such as pension
funds may occupy key positions in the drive for reform. See id.
85 SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the
1990's, 89 CORNELL L. REv. [101, 129-30] (2004) (discussing the herd behavior phenome-
non in the context of professional money managers).
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III
ENRON AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
The basic economic model of pre-Enron corporate disclosure is
relatively easy to construct. Economic theory as it relates to disclosure
dictates that high-quality corporations seeking to attract capital have
strong incentives to distinguish themselves from rivals because inves-
tors that cannot distinguish high- from low-quality issuers will not pay
more for securities from high-quality issuers.8 6 In other words, inade-
quate disclosure will force issuing corporations to pay higher capital
costs. Under this theory, antifraud rules prevent low-quality firms
from making misrepresentations that cause investors to mistakenly be-
lieve that they are high-quality firms.8 7
A. Mandatory v. Enabling Rules
However, the fact that high-quality firms have incentives to dis-
close truthful information about themselves to lower their costs of
capital and that low-quality firms have incentives to refrain from com-
mitting fraud does not imply that such disclosures should be made
mandatory by law. It is not obvious why disclosure should be
mandatory when disclosure itself is costly and firms appear to internal-
ize the costs of making inadequate disclosure. However, existing theo-
retical and empirical economic studies provide no more than weak
support for mandatory disclosure.8 8 Recent research indicates that
making the disclosure of certain information-such as audited bal-
anced sheets, audited profit and loss statements, proxy information
prior to shareholder meetings, and details on insider transactions-
mandatory resulted in significant positive abnormal returns to share-
holders in the range of sixteen to eighteen percent.8 9 This research
suggests that mandatory disclosure may benefit firms, either by solving
the collective action problems described below, or by assisting firms
who want to make certain disclosures about themselves to make these
disclosures more credible to investors.
One argument supporting mandatory disclosure states that exter-
nalities will lead to inadequate disclosure without sufficient regula-
tion.90 Externalities are economic side effects, arising when
contracting parties' actions affect third parties, who cannot be
86 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 683-85.
87 See id.
88 William H. Beaver, The Nature of Mandated Disclosure, in RICHARD A. POSNER & KEN-
NETH E. ScoTr, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 316 (1980).
89 Michael Greenstone, Paul Oyer, & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Mandated Disclo-
sure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments 2 (Oct. 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
90 See Beaver, supra note 88, at 319.
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charged or compensated for the benefits or costs they receive. 9 1 Pol-
lution is a classic example of an externality: Smoke generated by a
factory may impose health costs and cleanup costs on nearby residents
who receive no compensation for bearing such costs. Polluters bene-
fit from externalities if their production costs are lower than if pol-
luters had to bear the total costs of their activities, including those
incurred by third parties.
Corporate disclosures generate substantial externalities when
they aid investors and other entities dealing with or competing against
the disclosing firm. If, for example, disclosure helps competitors eval-
uate whether a particular product manufactured by the disclosing
firm is successful, it "may provide information to other firms about
their chances of success in similar product developments .... [and]
might even obviate their having to expend resources on product de-
velopments." 92 In such a case, there will be little incentive to disclose
because the disclosing firm is not compensated for the benefits that its
disclosure confers on other firms.93
It is unclear, however, whether externalities support or weaken
the case for mandatory disclosure. Mandatory disclosure ostensibly is
warranted in this context because absent regulation, firms will decline
to make certain disclosures for fear of passing benefits on to competi-
tors.94 Requiring disclosure under these conditions would be highly
inefficient if the benefits to competitors were so great that they caused
firms to halt product development. 95 Firms would refrain from devel-
oping new products if such developments were costly and competitors
could "free-ride" on the firms' required disclosures.9 6 Thus, the case
for mandatory disclosure remains indeterminate.
Further, some investors will read and benefit from a corpora-
tion's disclosure but ultimately decide not to invest. Such noninvest-
ing free-riders may acquire valuable information without paying the
costs of disclosure, while current shareholders are stuck with those
disclosure costs and without any influx of new capital. 9 7 As a result, a
suboptimal level of information will be disclosed unless such disclo-
sure is made mandatory. However, it is unclear why companies and
their investors should have to bear these disclosure costs, which inure
in part to third parties.
91 See id. at 320.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 685-86.
95 See Beaver, supra note 88, at 320.
96 Id.
97 See id. at 320-21 (explaining that, in such shareholder externality contexts, "cur-
rent shareholders bear the costs of disclosure, yet prospective shareholders share in the
benefits of disclosure (i.e., they are free riders)").
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A further economic justification for mandatory disclosure is that
an excessive level of searching for corporate financial information will
be conducted without it. Absent mandatory disclosure, investors will
engage in duplicative and inefficient searches for information about
public companies. 98 In contrast, requiring companies to disclose this
information publicly would clearly eliminate inefficiency. However, if
investors value the information, they would, presumably, be willing to
pay for it, and companies would have incentive to produce it if, as
Easterbrook and Fischel suggest, they can provide it more efficiently
than investors.99
The final argument for mandatory disclosure of corporate infor-
mation is that it would alleviate managers' incentives to suppress valu-
able information that is unfavorable. 0 0 Because traditional antifraud
rules do not affirmatively require firms to make disclosures, firms
must only be accurate in their disclosure if they choose to disclose
information at all. Mandatory disclosure might subject all firms to an-
tifraud laws, thereby solving the problem of managers suppressing un-
favorable information. On the other hand, investors might prefer to
delay the release of unfavorable information in order to give manage-
ment the time necessary to counter its effects. For example, before
disclosing the fact that a company has lost a major client or customer,
the firm may want some time to marshal its sales force to launch a
search for a replacement. The loss of the customer's orders may free
up some of the company's productive capacity, and if a new customer
can be found, the effects of the loss of the first customer can be miti-
gated. If the announcement is made prematurely, though, it can
harm morale and lead to an unwarranted loss of confidence in the
firm, making it hard to replace the lost business.
The Enron debacle revealed a number of deficiencies in the clas-
sic economic models of disclosure policy. Obviously, the assumption
that firms generally will disclose negative information about them-
selves must be re-examined. More fundamentally, the assumption
that investors will not invest in companies that fail to disclose suffi-
cient information about their financial condition likewise needs to be
reevaluated. Market and regulatory forces may punish firms that do
not make adequate disclosures about themselves in fact as well as in
theory, but the prospect of receiving such punishment is apparently
neither harsh nor immediate enough to deter the worst offenders.
98 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 681-82.
99 See id. at 682.
100 SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 722 (1984).
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In the following subsections, I make two additional contributions
to the economic theory of mandatory disclosure, both of which relate
to the economics of trust in the financial and capital markets.
B. Externalities
Externalities cause under-reporting, such as where firms unre-
lated to Enron are punished for Enron's wrongdoing. As noted above,
externalities can lead to both overproduction and underproduction:
positive externalities cause underproduction because firms producing
the externality go uncompensated, whereas negative externalities
cause overproduction because firms producing the externality never
pay the costs they impose on third parties. 10
Enron's misleading financial statements created an unequivocal
negative externality. While they benefited Enron and its management
for a time, these statements clearly tended to harm other firms, partic-
ularly those in the energy trading sector, by diminishing investor's
confidence in the accuracy of the financial reporting of these compa-
nies.10 2 Investors naturally are concerned that other companies have
managers and disclosure policies like Enron's. Put differently, En-
ron's actions harmed other companies by diminishing the degree to
which investors and lenders trust corporate disclosure. Because En-
ron did not fully internalize the costs of its disclosure policies, they did
not deter its conduct. Failure to account for this negative effect of
misleading disclosures constitutes a deficiency in the standard law and
economics model.
C. Collective Action Problems
The current economic model of disclosure also fails to account
for the collective action problem, similar to a prisoners' dilemma,
faced by corporations like Enron when they establish disclosure poli-
cies. 10 3 The prisoners' dilemma, which models a problem faced by
101 See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
102 Capital is scarce. To the extent that Enron's misleading financial statements made
the company look more profitable, financially secure and promising than the facts war-
ranted, Enron's access to capital, and its cost of capital, would have been better and
cheaper relative to its competitors than it deserved.
103 See Barry Nalebuff, Prisoners'Dilemma, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAvE DIcTIONARY OF Eco-
NOMICS AND THE LAW 89-94 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). In the original version of the
prisoners' dilemma, police arrest two suspects on suspicion of armed robbery and separate
them for interrogation. Each prisoner must choose whether to confess and implicate the
other suspect or to remain silent. If neither prisoner confesses, police and prosecutors can
obtain a criminal conviction only for carrying a concealed weapon. If one prisoner con-
fesses, the government can obtain convictions on both the weapons charge and on the far
more serious charge of armed robbery. A prisoner can obtain a drastic sentence reduction
by confessing, but if one prisoner refuses to confess and his partner-in-crime confesses, the
prisoner who refuses to talk will receive a particularly harsh sentence. In other words, no
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groups or individuals unable to cooperate with each other, is the best-
known construct of game theory in the social sciences. 10 4 Without co-
operation, individuals and companies pursue their own, rational self-
interest, making suboptimal decisions from the perspective of the
group as a whole.
Applying this framework to corporate disclosure policy, two hypo-
thetical companies, Enron and Exron, which are identical in every
way, must each choose between having highly transparent and hon-
est-"good"-disclosure policies and having highly opaque and obfus-
catory-"bad"-policies. Simultaneously pursuing a good disclosure
policy produces a better result for both companies, but each company
can benefit individually by adopting a bad disclosure policy, provided
the other company adopts a good one. The worst outcome for either
company would be to adopt a good disclosure policy if the other com-
pany adopts a bad disclosure policy. In a world of limited capital,
each company can benefit at the expense of the other company by
making false or misleading disclosures to convince investors that their
securities are worth more than those of the other company. An ini-
tially honest company can narrow this differential only by engaging in
fraudulent conduct to counteract other firms' fraudulent conduct.
In particular, both firms would disclose a certain acute problem if
they were completely honest with the investing public. If such disclo-
sures were made, neither firm would suffer relative to the other, al-
though the share prices of both firms would decline. However, the
market punishes the firm and its managers as soon as they make the
disclosure. Therefore, if Enron discloses the information but Exron
does not, then the market will punish Enron immediately, but Exron
will emerge unscathed. In monetary terms, Enron's stock would drop
from, say, $100 per share to, say, $25 per share, while Exron's shares
will stay, for the time being, at $100 per share. Similarly, if Exron
discloses the information but Enron does not, Exron's stock will drop
to $25, and Enron's stock will remain at $100.
matter what the other prisoner does, a suspect can improve his own position by confessing
and implicating the other suspect. However, the prisoners would obtain the best collective
result if both remained silent. See infra note 104 for a chart depicting the outcome under
the various scenarios described here.
104 See id. The following chart reflects the jail sentence each suspect described in note
103 supra would receive under the four possible scenarios:
Prisoners' Dilemma
Prisoner 1 confesses: Prisoner 1 doesn't confess:
Prisoner 2 confesses: Prisoner 1: 10 years Prisoner 1: 25 years
Prisoner 2: 10 years Prisoner 2: 3 years
Prisoner 1: 3 years Prisoner 1: 1 year
Prisoner 2 doesn't confess: Prisoner 2: 25 years Prisoner 2: 1 year
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Thus, both firms have incentives not to disclose because each
firm will obtain the best possible outcome if it refrains from disclosing
and the other firm makes the disclosure. However, each firm will suf-
fer the worst possible outcome if it discloses and the other firm hides
the information.
Unfortunately, if neither firm makes the appropriate disclosure,
market participants generally will come to distrust the public disclo-
sure of reporting companies, and the value of both investments will
shrink, say, to $30 per share. But if both firms make the appropriate
disclosure, share prices will only drop to $50 per share because inves-
tors and other market participates will be confident that all of the
negative information about the company has been circulated. The
following table illustrates these outcomes:
Prisoners' Dilemma and Disclosure
Enron discloses: Enron doesn't disclose:
Enron: $50 Enron: $100
Exron discloses: Exron: $50 Exron: $25
Enron: $25 Enron: $30
Exron doesn't disclose: Exron: $100 Exron: $30
The problem becomes more pronounced when one moves the
example from a two-firm theoretical construct to the real world, in
which there are hundreds of thousands of public companies. Share
prices remain high so long as investors trust the overall integrity of the
public disclosure system. If investors come to distrust the system, how-
ever, then share prices will collapse, and all firms will suffer. Firms
that commit to making public disclosure about themselves have strong
incentives to "cheat" by making false, partial, or misleading disclo-
sures. Whereas cheating by a small number of firms will benefit those
firms if confidence in the system as a whole remains generally high,
cheating by a large percentage of reporting companies will cause
share prices to collapse because investors will no longer trust the
market.
If all public companies made binding agreements to report fully,
fairly, and honestly, the best of all possible prisoner's dilemma disclo-
sure outcomes for both firms and society would result. This scenario
maximizes firms' pool of available capital and contributes to low cost
of capital and the high quality of capital markets. However, each firm
can benefit at the expense of its rivals by cheating slightly on its prom-
ise to make full and fair disclosure of material information, thereby
making itself look comparatively better and further lowering its cost of
capital. Therefore, cheating on disclosure is the dominant, "maxi-
min," strategy: it is the only way to obtain the maximum benefit-
producing the lowest cost of capital-when one firm alone makes mis-
leading disclosures, but at the same time it is the only way to avoid the
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worst, i.e., "minimum," outcome, which results if one firm is honest
but all other firms cheat.
Thus, honest firms face something akin to a prisoners' dilemma
when establishing their disclosure policies. Dishonest rivals can bene-
fit at the expense of honest firms by making false or incomplete dis-
closures, but widespread cheating will eventually cause the system to
collapse under the weight of its own dishonesty. In this context, regu-
lation of public disclosure is necessary to solve the prisoners' dilemma
facing public companies because a severe punishment for false report-
ing will eliminate firms' incentive to cheat. Recent empirical research
supports the conclusion that mandatory disclosure may benefit inves-
tors by reducing agency costs.10 5
IV
ENRON AND MARKET EFFICIENCY
Issues of market efficiency are closely connected to issues of dis-
closure, and therefore assumptions about the reasons for market effi-
ciency inform our views about disclosure.
Securities markets function efficiently when share price fully re-
flects information about the issuer. 10 6 In economists' terms, an effi-
ciency model where prices reflect all information until the point at
which the marginal costs of using the information outweigh the attain-
able profits is most sensible. 10 7 Securities markets are described as
"weak form" efficient if share prices reflect only the information im-
plied by historical prices, "semi-strong" efficient if securities prices re-
flect all publicly available information about the company, and
"strong form" efficient if securities prices reflect all information-
both public as well as private inside information.1 08
Virtually no support exists for the "strong" form of the efficient
capital markets hypothesis (ECMH), which makes sense because insid-
ers can earn significant, abnormal returns by trading on non-public
information. On the other hand, there is considerable support for
105 See Greenstone, Oyer, & Vissing-Jorgensen, supra note 89.
106 See Beaver, supra note 88, at 328 ("(T]he market is efficient with respect to a given
piece of information if prices act as ifeveryone possessed that information and were able to
interpret its implications for security prices").
107 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46J. FIN. 1575 (1991) ("[An] eco-
nomically more sensible version of the efficiency hypothesis says that prices reflect infor-
mation to the point where the marginal benefits of acting on information (the profits to be
made) do not exceed the marginal costs." (citation omitted)); Anomalous Evidence, supra
note 9, at 96 ("A market is efficient with respect to information set -t if it is impossible to
make economic profits by trading on the basis of information set 0").
108 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25J. FIN. 383, 388 (1970); Anomalous Evidence, supra note 9, at 97.
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the "weak" and "semi-strong" forms of the ECMH. 10 9 In particular,
studies have shown that mutual fund managers relying on publicly
available information do not outperform the market indices. 10
Market efficiency protects shareholders and saves them money:
efficient share prices that reflect all available information permit
shareholders to buy and sell shares at fair, unbiased prices in reliance
on publicly listed prices. As a result, shareholders need not incur the
cost of ferreting out information about the companies in which they
invest.
Put differently, average shareholders cannot be expected to un-
derstand the arcane world of corporate accounting and finance.
Prices must therefore be efficient in order to encourage average peo-
ple to rely on the information content of securities prices. To the
extent that the market is efficient, share prices would protect investors
without the need to read lengthy and impenetrable disclosure
documents.
What does Enron reveal about the efficiency of the market?
From one perspective, Enron's collapse casts some serious doubts on
the efficiency of the market. After all, the company's shares fell from
over $85 per share in September 2000 to just over $25 per share in
2001, to almost zero in 2002.111 Had the market for Enron stock been
efficient, share prices would have reflected the related-party transac-
tions commencing in 1997.
In fact, CalPERS wanted to cash in its JEDI I stake in September
1997 because of its concerns about the conflict of interest transac-
tions. Rather than liquidate JEDI I, Enron looked for another party to
invest $383 million in CalPERS' place. Enter Chewco Investments,
created specifically for that purpose. 12 This does not deflate the
"semi-strong" form of the ECMH, however, because CalPERS received
material nonpublic information-not included in the "semi-strong"
form of efficiency-during its negotiations with Enron about itsJEDI I
investment.
On the other hand, analyst Jim Chanos began scrutinizing En-
ron's financial statements in September 1990 and proceeded to trade
109 See Stephen A. Ross et al., Corporate Finance, reprinted in part in FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE LAW 45, 51-58 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993).
110 Id. at 57 (noting that this is indicative of and "consistent with semistrong-form and
weak-form efficiency").
111 For a particularly colorful chart of Enron's share price over time, see the Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach Web site, http://www.enronfraud.com/pdf/enron-chart2.
pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2003); http://stocks.tradingcharts.com/stocks/charts/ENE/M
(last visited Dec. 20, 2003).
112 See PowERs REPORT, supra note 6, at 44-45.
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at the height of Enron's success. 113 Chanos realized that Enron,
which was trading at sixty times its earnings, was vastly overvalued.' 14
Moreover, using publicly available documents, Chanos calculated that
Enron was earning only seven percent on its capital, as compared to
an average cost of capital of ten percent.' 15
A September 2000 article in the now-defunct Texas edition of the
Wall Street Journal inspired Chanos to look more closely into Enron's
financial condition." 6 The article questioned the quality of stated
earnings at Enron and a number of other companies with large en-
ergy trading departments and pointed out that investors may not real-
ize that Enron's large reported profits were in the form of large,
unrealized noncash gains that could be wiped out by changes in mar-
ket conditions. 1 7 For example, Enron had booked $747 million in
unrealized gains from trading activities during the second quarter of
2000-far exceeding its $609 million pretax earnings."t 8 In other
words, Enron would have suffered a quarterly loss without these un-
realized gains, rather than the 26% increase in earnings it actually
reported. 19
Enron's financials did not reveal that two-thirds of the company's
debt was not disclosed on its balance sheet. However, its annual and
quarterly reports reveal that an unnamed Enron "senior officer" su-
pervised several limited partnerships engaged in numerous transac-
tions with the company, all of which removed assets from Enron's
books while providing Enron with revenue.' 20 For this reason, Cha-
nos singled out Enron, then trading at $80 per share, at his firm's
annual "Bears in Hibernation" meeting in February 2001.121
The market's apparent inability to translate the signal sent when
Skilling, Enron's former President and Chief Operating Officer, re-
113 Jonathan R. Laing, The Bear That Roared: How Short-Seller.Jim Chanos Helped Expose
Enron, BARRON'S, Jan. 28, 2002, at 18.
114 See id. Chanos reasoned that Enron should trade more like a hedge fund than an
energy company because it relied on trading for more than eighty percent of its earnings,
and in that case many other, better-performing hedge funds' shares were priced attrac-
tively relative to Enron's. See id.
115 See id.
116 See Lessons Learned from Enron's Collapse: Auditing the Accounting Industry: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 72 (2d Sess. 2002) (testimony
of James Chanos, President, Kynikos Assoc., Ltd.).
117 SeeJonathan Weil, Energy Traders Cite Gains, but Some Math Is Missing, WALL ST. J.,
TEx. J., Sept. 20, 2000, at T1, available at 2000 WVL-WSJ 26610344; see also POWERS REPORT,
supra note 6, at 11 ("Enron sold assets to [certain SPEs] that it wanted to remove from its
books. These transactions often occurred close to the end of financial reporting peri-
ods."); id. at 12-13.
118 See Weil, supra note 117.
119 See id.
120 The identity of this partner was revealed in October 2001 to be Andrew Fastow,
Enron's CFO. See id.
121 See id.
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signed in December 2000 demonstrates another hole in the ECMH. t22
Moreover, Enron share prices remained high in the first quarter of
2001, even after Bethany McLean's article titled "Is Enron Over-
priced?" questioned Enron's "impenetrable" accounting practices. 123
Not all of the evidence surrounding Enron's share price collapse
points towards market inefficiency, however. In particular, the market
price provided a far better signal of Enron's decline than the ratings
posted by both credit rating agencies and analysts. Nevertheless, ana-
lysts' continued "buy" recommendations, even after the Company dis-
closed that its last five years of earnings needed to be restated,
indicates that analysts were more concerned with currying favor with
issuers than distributing honest ratings.
Enron insiders' sale of more than a billion dollars of Enron stock
in the years preceding the company's collapse provides further proof
that the strong form of the ECMH is not valid.
CONCLUSION
The history of capital markets regulation is largely a series of reg-
ulatory responses to problems already corrected by market forces. 124
While it is easy to say that the irresponsible and lawless actions that led
to Enron's collapse should not be repeated, it is considerably more
difficult to discern the appropriate measures to prevent another mon-
umental collapse. The most forceful and effective action thus far has
been initiated not by regulators, legislators, or academics, but by inves-
tors.' 25 Enron, along with the "steady stream of accounting scandals,
corporate chicanery and questionable practices at Wall Street firms,"
has damaged investors' confidence in the market. 126 Further, the un-
scrupulous conduct of senior executives has wounded the business
community as a whole. 127 Interestingly, as reported in a recent poll,
eighty-four percent of U.S. investors believe that dubious accounting
practices are responsible for U.S. markets' dismal performances this
122 See McLean, supra note 26, at 58 (describing Skilling's resignation as "what should
have been the clearest signal yet of serious problems").
123 McLean, supra note 53.
124 For an insightful analysis of lessons that one should not derive from Enron's col-
lapse, see C. Evan Stewart, Caveat 'Reformers: Lessons Not 7o Be Learned from Enron's Collapse,
34(8) BNA SECURITIEs REGULATION LAw REPORT ANALYSIS AND PERSPECTIVE 310, Feb. 25,
2002.
125 See, eg,. Nick Evans, Enronitis, Witch-hunts, and Financial Hypochondria, EUROMONEY,
Mar. 2002, at 42 (describing Krispy Kreme's immediate announcement to restructure the
financing of a factory after a New York Post article warned investors that Krispy Kreme
planned to finance the factory with off-balance sheet transactions).
126 Gretchen Morgenson, What If Investors Won't Join the Party ? N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2002,
§ 3, at 1.
127 Patrick McGeehan, Goldman Chief Urges Reforms in Corporations, N.Y. TIMS, June 6,
2002, at C1.
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year, much more than the war in Iraq or terrorism concerns. 128 More-
over, a staggering seventy-one percent of U.S. investors think ques-
tionable accounting practices are widespread in business. 129
Consequently, investors are less prone to invest in stocks or mutual
funds than before. 130 Thus, the corruption among corporate execu-
tives and analysts is hindering the growth and recovery of our
market.1 3 1
Investors doubt the fundamental fairness of American capital
markets to a greater extent now than anytime since the Great Depres-
sion. Firms in search of capital will have to address investors' con-
cerns about the market honesty or face capital costs so high that the
prospects for meaningful economic recovery all but disappear. Mean-
ingful reform, in my view, will require fewer technical disclosure rules.
Such technical disclosure requirements provided the blueprint for En-
ron's financial fraud, where accounting rules were employed to hide
the company's debt through off-balance sheet limited partnerships.
Rather, investors need disclosure that is simple, clear and informa-
tive. 13 2 The current, highly technical accounting system is easy to ma-
nipulate because of its complexity, and firms will take advantage of
this fact because of the intense pressure to produce a profit.13 3 Regu-
lators should streamline and simplify the stupefying disclosure rules
that Enron so easily manipulated.
The oligopolistic nature of the accounting, credit rating, and in-
vestment banking industries impedes meaningful reform in these sec-
tors. Without independent analysts, investors lose faith in the
system. 13 4 At this writing, there are only four functional accounting
firms, two dominant credit rating agencies, and a handful of "bulge
bracket"13 5 investment banks in an industry that is "overly dominated"
by these established firms. 136 These firms may not have sufficient in-
128 Morgenson, supra note 126.
129 University of Michigan Monthly Consumer Confidence Report, at http://www.
sca.isr.umich.edu/main.php.
130 See Morgenson, supra note 126.
131 McGeehan, supra note 127.
132 See Stewart, supra note 124, at 310. This disclosure must clearly delineate the as-
sumptions used to make claims regarding valuations, and it must also explain which valua-
tions are based on qualitative judgments.
133 See McGeehan, supra note 127.
134 See id.
135 "Bulge bracket" is Wall Streetjargon for the most elite investment banks. The term
refers to the banks in an underwriting syndicate responsible for selling the largest amounts
of the issuer's securities and whose names appear first on prospectuses and "tombstone"
ads. Ayako Yasuda, Do Bank-Firm Relationships Affect Bank Competition in the Corporate
Bond Underwriting Market? Uan. 10, 2003) (Wharton School Working Paper), at http://
finance.wharton.upenn.edu/-rlwctrpapers/0302.pdf.
136 Redesign Flaws: Investment Banking, ECONOMIST-JAPAN.COM, http://www.economistja-
pan.com/2002/20021116/cont_e02.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2003).
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centives to thoroughly reform themselves until they are forced to face
an increased level of rigorous competition. Rather than piling on new
laws to regulate the financial markets, regulators should devise strate-
gies to encourage more market competition.
